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ABSTRACT 
The issue revolving corporate governance has always been an essential and critical 
element for both private and public sectors particularly in Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister has even stressed for more concentration on the issues of 
governance for the purpose of overseeing the effective running of the public and 
private sector through a check and balance system. Moreover, the Prime Minister 
argued the need of the firms in the country to benchmark to an effective system that 
emphasizes on positive issues such as ethics, openness, accountability, transparency, 
and integrity in the public and private sector. After 1998, Malaysian government 
decided to adopt corporate reform that could enhance the quality of good corporate 
management practice. This reform is clearly stated in the code and rules of 
corporate governance. This included the introduction of the new Malaysian code 
and rules for corporate governance. The debate of corporate governance in 
Malaysia are often limited to agencies involved directly in law enforcement such as 
the Ministry of Finance, Bursa Malaysia Securities, security Commission (SC) and 
Registrar of Company. Therefore, this crucial issue has to be addressed accordingly 
in order to enhance firms’ dividend payout. 
Good corporate governance is believed to be a critical factor in the improvement 
of firm value in both developing and developed financial markets. However, this 
belief overlooked the fact that the relationship between corporate governance and 
the value of a firm varies in these markets owing to the character of the corporate 
governance structures on dissimilar social, economic and regulatory conditions. 
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This reality calls for the need to examine and comprehend the differences 
affecting the firm value for the purpose of academic, financial and management 
practices and public regulation of markets and corporations. 
The core aim of the present study is the examination of the relationship between 
board characteristics and dividend payout of Malaysian firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia with focus on the construction sector. For the purpose of the study, data 
was collected from a sample of 50 companies for the financial year of 2010 with 
elimination of other 56 firms that they did not pay dividend. Among corporate 
governance’s various variables, seven were chosen to be included in the study. 
They were board size, board composition, CEO duality, family linked 
companies, board of director ethnicity, gender of board of director, and 
managerial ownership. Other financial measurements (investment 
opportunity set, firm leverage, firm size, and firm performance) were also 
tested against dividend payout. 
Regression analysis was utilized for the examination of the relationship between 
board characteristics and firm dividend payout. The result indicates that the 
relationships between investment opportunity set, firm size, firm performance, and 
managerial ownership and dividend payout are positive, but not significant. Firm 
leverage, board size, board composition, family linked, ethnicity of board of 
director, and gender of board of director are negatively insignificantly correlated to 
dividend payout. CEO duality and dividend payout is also negatively correlated but the 
relationship is significant. Finally, this study is using the firm leverage, firm size, firm 
performance, and CEO duality role as control variables against dividend payout. 
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Businesses around the world require development and growth in order to attract 
funding from investors. Before they invest in a particular business, investors 
normally make sure that the business in question is financially secure and stable and 
possesses the ability to produce profits in the long run (Mallin, 2007). Hence, in 
instances where the company position is not as promising, it will not be as attractive 
to investors as it hopes to be. This failure to attract enough capital normally leads to 
negative consequences for the business in particular and for the economy in general. 
Looking at local and global economic situation, it has been noticed that the economic 
situation is unstable. Uncertainty of the future of economies is high. However, 
property sector maybe is more secure and has less variability than other sectors. 
According to MBAM (Master Builders Association Malaysia) outlook, construction 
sector will keep stable in the future. 
Abu Mansor (2010), explained that while all other sectors recorded negative growth 
in 2009, construction sector was the only sector that recorded a positive growth in 
2009, during every quarter.  The importance of construction sectors comes as it is 
considered as a contributor segment in the Malaysian economy, due to the interaction 
with other industries.  
The contents of 
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